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Remarks on the International Legal Character
of the Paris Agreement*
JACOB WERKSMAN†

I. INTRODUCTION
These informal remarks on the legal character of the Paris
Agreement were made in February 2016, only a few months after the
Agreement was adopted by acclamation by the representatives of
more than 190 countries.1 Governments sped to ratify the
Agreement, triggering its entry into international legal force on
November 4, 2016, less than a year after its adoption.2 The wide
support of the international community for the Paris Agreement was
forged through many compromises, including on the Agreement’s
legal character.3 As will be described, a number of the compromises
that weakened the Agreement’s legal character were made, in part, to
© 2019 Jacob Werksman
*
This Article is based on the third 2016 ‘Environmental Law Brodies Lecture’
delivered by the author on February 9th, 2016, shortly after the Paris Agreement was
adopted. It has been brought up to date in light of more recent developments. The Brodies
lecture is held every year at the University of Edinburgh in association with Brodies LLP.
†
Jacob Werksman is Principal Advisor, Directorate General for Climate Action,
European Commission and was a Lead Negotiator for the European Union during the Paris
Agreement negotiations. The lecture was delivered in his personal capacity and reflects his
own views. These views are informed by his professional involvement in the climate change
negotiations, on and off, since 1991, representing a range of governments and NGOs,
beginning as a legal advisor to the Alliance of Small Island States, working with various
European governments.
1. Status of Treaties: 7.d Paris Agreement, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties
.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7d&chapter=27&clang=
_en (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
2. Id.
3. Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 REV. EUR.
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142 (2016).
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accommodate U.S. domestic politics.4 Knowing that the consent of a
Republican-controlled Senate for a new international treaty on
climate change was unlikely, the Obama Administration worked to
craft an agreement that the executive branch could join under its
authority alone.5 In September 2016, the United States joined the
Paris Agreement by Executive Order.6 On June 1, 2017, under a new
administration, the United States announced its intent, through the
exercise of executive authority alone, to withdraw from the
Agreement.7 Unless the Administration reverses its decision, U.S.
withdrawal will become effective November 4, 2020, the day after
the U.S. Presidential elections.8
After briefly describing the Agreement’s essential features, I
turn to the issue of its legal character, describing for whom, how, and
why this issue became such a key aspect of the Paris negotiations.9 I
describe what I understand to be the dimensions of legal character,
and how the Paris Agreement can be tested against these
dimensions.10 I then focus specifically on the provisions at the heart
of the Paris Agreement that describe each Party’s commitment to
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.11 A deal was reached on these
provisions by preserving two distinctions: firstly, the distinction
between the legal form of the Agreement and the legal character of
these provisions; and secondly the distinction between obligations of
conduct and obligations of result.
Since its adoption, the international legal character of the Paris
Agreement has continued to be the subject of academic debate—
particularly in the United States—with many concluding that it is an
4. See infra Section V.
5. See infra Section VII(B).
6. Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters Paris
Agreement, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Sept. 3, 2016), https://obamawh
itehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states-formally-enters-parisagreement.
7. Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal From the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC . 373 (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statementpresident-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
8. Chris Mooney, Trump Can’t Actually Exit the Paris Deal Until the Day After the
2020 Election. That’s a Big Deal, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.washin
gtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/12/12/heres-what-election-means-us-withdrawalparis-climate-deal/?utm_term=.99ee26f9c89a; see also G.A. Res. 1/CP.21, art. 28, Paris
Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
[hereinafter Paris Agreement].
9. See infra Section IV.
10. See infra Section VI.
11. See infra Section VII.
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internationally legally binding treaty, with a mixture of “top-down”
binding elements and “bottom-up” flexibility that leaves much to the
discretion of its Parties.12 In the three years since the Agreement was
adopted, its Parties have concluded negotiations on the “Paris
Rulebook” —a set of decisions that provide detailed guidance on how
the Agreement will be implemented.13 These remarks will not
address the relationship between the Rulebook and the Agreement’s
legal character, but in my view, by setting out how Parties will report
regularly on their emissions and how they will track progress toward
implementing and achieving their targets, the Rulebook will
strengthen the Agreement’s normative force.
II. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT
The Paris Agreement sets ambitious long term goals by
clarifying the temperature and emissions limits associated with a
stable climate system.14 It aims to hold global average temperature
rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius and to pursue efforts to limit this
rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.15 To achieve these goals, its Parties aim
to reach a global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as
possible, and climate neutral emissions—a balance of emissions from
sources and removals by sinks—in the second half of this century.16
To this end, the Agreement will catalyze domestic climate
policies and policymaking processes, through a requirement that each
of its Parties prepare, communicate, and regularly update an
emissions reduction target (“nationally determined contributions”—

12. Daniel Bodansky notes that the debate over the legal character of the Paris
Agreement has continued—particularly among US academics—even after the Agreement
was adopted and entered into force. Bodansky, supra note 3. He summarizes the source of
the debate as confusion about the different characteristics of legal form. Id. He concludes
that the Paris Agreement is a treaty within the deﬁnition of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, but not every provision of the agreement creates a legal obligation. Id. It
contains a mix of mandatory and nonmandatory provisions. Id. The debate clearly has
additional political and legal dimensions in the US, where even supporters of the Agreement
consistently refer to it as the “Paris Accord” in an apparent effort to support the Obama
Administration’s decision to ratify the Agreement by executive authority rather than through
the treaty approval powers of the US Senate. Id.
13. Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the
Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, held in Katowice from 2 to 15
December, UNFCCC (Mar. 19, 2019), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018
_3%28report%29_advance.pdf.
14. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2(1)(a).
15. Id.
16. Id. arts. 2(1)(a), 4(1).
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or NDC)17 every five years. The Agreement also puts in place a
mandatory and robust transparency and accountability system to track
each Party’s implementation and achievement of its NDC.18
Further, the Agreement calls for continued financial and
technical support to poor and vulnerable countries, both to cut their
emissions, as well as to prepare for the impacts of climate change.19
It creates a new paradigm for climate governance through a
contemporary understanding of how to share common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities between
richer and poorer countries. The Agreement leaves behind the
outdated definitions of developed and developing countries that were
agreed to in 1992, and that had divided climate politics for decades.
Under Paris, each Party determines for itself the level of ambition it
considers a fair contribution to achieving the Agreement’s goals.20
III. LEGAL CHARACTER OVER THREE DECADES OF CLIMATE
NEGOTIATIONS
The legal character of the Paris Agreement became an obsession
for climate negotiators. This needs to be understood in the context of
the treaties and other decisions that came before Paris. The Paris
Agreement is the third internationally legally binding treaty on
climate change negotiated since the early 1990s. The first is the 1992
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty
that sets out basic principles, institutions, and procedures for
reporting on emissions and policies, but no clear targets or timetables
for reducing emissions.21 The UNFCCC establishes the regime’s
governing body—the Conference of the Parties (COP).22 The second
treaty, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, contains legally
binding emissions budgets (2008-2012); internationally authorized
17. Id. arts. 4(2), 4(9), 14.
18. Id. arts. 13(1), 13(2), 13(6), 13(7)(b).
19. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(5).
20. Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris
from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, ¶ 27.
While the terms “developed” and “developing” are used throughout the Paris Agreement,
these are undefined, and many of the Agreement’s main commitments are applicable to all
Parties. There are strong political expectations that those countries classified as developed in
1992 continue to take the lead under the Agreement by fulfilling the developed country
commitments to provide climate finance (Article 9(1)) and to maintain economy-wide
emissions reduction targets (Article 4(4)). See Paris Agreement, supra note 14.
21. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June 4,
1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
22. Id. ¶ 7.
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carbon markets and a compliance system authorized to impose
binding sanctions—but its substantive obligations apply only to those
industrialized countries—primarily the European Union and its
Member States—that agreed to join and remain within its
constraints.23
An effort to draw the rest of the world’s emitters into a new
legally binding treaty failed spectacularly at the 2009 COP in
Copenhagen.24 This led to a period of experimentation between
2012-2020 with a two track system—the developed country Parties to
the Kyoto Protocol were persuaded to negotiate a second
commitment period of binding targets, while the rest of the world
would participate through a system of voluntary “pledges” and
review set up by non-binding COP decisions under the Convention.25
The design of the post-2020 regime began in earnest at the
Durban COP in 2011. The “Durban mandate,” which set the terms of
reference for the negotiation of what became the Paris Agreement
established “a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention
applicable to all Parties.”26 This language allowed sufficient
ambiguity for the negotiations to move ahead with the support of the
European Union and other progressive Parties, which favored a treaty
with binding targets based on the Kyoto Protocol;27 countries like
India, which preferred an outcome based on COP decisions, like the

23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162; see also Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts,
CNN (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/26/world/kyoto-protocol-fast-facts/
indx.html.
24. Key Powers Reach Compromise at Climate Summit, BBC (Dec. 19, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8421935.stm; John Vidal et al., Low Targets, Goals
Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2009), https://www.thegua
rdian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal.
25. Jacob Werksman, Q&A: The Legal Character and Legitimacy of the Cancun
Agreements, WORLD RESOURCES INSTIT. (Dec. 17, 2010), https://www.wri.org/blog/2010/12/
qa-legal-character-and-legitimacy-cancun-agreements.
26. Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban
from 28 November to 11 December 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, at 2
[hereinafter Durban Mandate].
27. Nuno S. Lacasta et al., Consensus Among Many Voices: Articulating the European
Union’s Position on Climate Change, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 400 (2002).
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existing system of “pledge and review;”28 and those like the United
States, which were looking for an indeterminate something in
between.29
In the midst of the Durban mandate, at the Warsaw COP in
2013, Parties returned to the issue of legal character when deciding
whether the emissions reduction targets in the Agreement, would be
characterized as “commitments” (a word which to many implied a
binding form) or "contributions" (a word chosen because it was
devoid of meaning).30 While characterized as an outcome that did
not “prejudge” the legal character of a final deal, agreeing to use the
term “nationally determined contributions” at this stage of the
negotiations very likely weakened the prospects that the legal
character of the targets would be binding and strengthened the
prospects that the form of the Agreement would be binding.
In 2015, in the weeks before the Paris COP, the debate and
confusion around legal character flared up again. The press fanned
some flames between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and French
Minister Laurent Fabius (who would brilliantly chair the Paris COP)
lit by a mischaracterization in a Financial Times headline that read
“Paris Climate Deal Will Not Be A Legally Binding Treaty.”31 What
Sec. Kerry had in fact said, as reported in the body of the article, was
that there were “not going to be legally binding reduction targets like
Kyoto.”32 He was referring not to the legal form of the Agreement,
but rather to the targets (“contributions”) that would be contained
within the agreement.33
Even the final moments of the Paris negotiations were marked
by controversy over legal character. In the final plenary of the COP,
the French COP presidency presented the Parties with a compromise,
28. MINISTRY OF ENV’T AND FORESTS, GOV’T OF INDIA, CLIMATE CHANGE
NEGOTIATIONS: INDIA’S SUBMISSIONS TO THE UNFCCC 29–31 (2009), http://www.moef
.nic.in/downloads/public-information/UNFCCC_final.pdf; see also, Armin Rosencranz et al.,
Climate Change Adaption, Measures, and Policies in India, 22 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV.
575.
29. Jason Obold et al., Impressions from Durban: COP-17 and Current Climate
Change Policies, 23 COLO. J. OF INT’L. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 389, 394–96 (2012).
30. Fiona Harvey, As the Warsaw Climate Talks End, the Hard Work is Just Beginning,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/25/
warsaw-climate-talks-end-cop19-2015.
31. Demetri Sevastopulo & Pilita Clark, Paris Climate Deal Will Not Be a Legally
Binding Treaty, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/79daf872-889411e5-90de-f44762bf9896.html#axzz3zTw0Re5w.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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to the surprise of many. It had substituted the word “should” in a
previous draft with the word “shall” in a provision describing the
expectation that developed countries undertake economy-wide
absolute emissions reduction targets as their NDCs.34 The United
States objected on the basis of legal form and on differentiations
between developed and developing countries.35 With the COP
Presidency taking responsibility for what it described as a clerical
“error,” the UNFCCC Secretariat reinstated the word “should”
alongside other largely cosmetic adjustments to the text.36 The
incident was allowed to pass and the Paris Agreement, with one more
“should” and one fewer “shall,” was adopted by acclamation.37
IV. WHY DOES LEGAL CHARACTER MATTER?
Why did the European Union and other Parties care so much
about the legal character of the Paris Agreement? In essence,
advocates for “a legally binding agreement” believe that a binding
agreement is more likely to affect state behavior, as well as the
behavior of other actors.38 A binding agreement is the highest form
of the expression of the political will of its Parties and of the political
priority of the issues it addresses.39 It is an expression of the Parties’
intent to be bound and an indication that others can act in reliance on
that intent.40
Internationally, the legally binding character of an agreement
provides the foundation for institution building, including the
legislative functions of the COP and the legal personality of its
Secretariat. Internationally, robust legal agreements often bring with
them the institutions and procedures for transparency and
accountability appropriate to any serious contract between Parties.41
The legal character of an international agreement can catalyze other
international agreements and institutions in an important way. For
34. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(4).
35. Yong-Xiang Zhang et al., The Withdrawal of the U.S. From the Paris Agreement
and Its Impact on Global Climate Change Governance, 8 KEAI 213, 215 (2017).
36. See generally John Vidal, How a ‘Typo’ Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/
16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal.
37. Id.
38. Daniel Bodansky, Legally Binding Versus Non-Legally Binding Instruments, in
TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME , 155 (Scott Barrett, Carlo
Carraro, & Jaime de Melo eds., 2015).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 162.
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example, international trade agreements increasingly contain
commitments that promote the implementation of international
environmental treaties,42 and the World Bank environmental
safeguards relate to environmental treaties to which host countries are
bound.43
The international legal character of the regime helps mobilize
the highest level of participation by governments, the private sector
and the media. The Paris COP would not have broken records (i.e.,
the number of heads of state and government, as well as mayors, and
CEOs in attendance; the public and private sector financial resources
mobilized; the international headlines captured)44 had the Paris COP
not been a treaty-based body, negotiating a new treaty.
Domestically, internationally binding agreements more often
engage parliaments in their ratification, leading to the codification or
strengthening of domestic implementation laws and regulations.45 If
properly ratified by more than one branch of government, such
agreements can better survive changes in political cycles.46 They
provide a higher profile focus for domestic stakeholders and
constituencies, and may be justiciable in national courts or otherwise
actionable.47
In the course of four years of negotiations, from Durban to Paris,
this view in favor of a legally binding agreement was challenged—as
naïve, positivist, and even dangerous—by both delegations and
academics.48 Some argued, for example, that, in the absence of
42. See, e.g., Gerda van Roozendaal, The Inclusion of Environmental Concerns in US
Trade Agreements, 18(3) ENVTL. POL. 431, 431–38 (2009).
43. Among the Operational Principles that are to inform a World Bank Environment
Assessment include assessing “the adequacy of the applicable legal and institutional
framework, including applicable international environmental agreements, and confirm that
they provide that the cooperating government does not finance project activities that would
contravene such international obligations.” Table A1 – Environmental and Social Safeguard
Policies—Policy Objectives and Operational Principles, WORLD BANK (July 2005),
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Environmental%20and%20social%
20safeguard%20policie.pdf.
44. The Paris COP21 Climate Summit in Numbers, LOCAL FRANCE (Nov. 30, 2015),
https://www.thelocal.fr/20151130/cop-21-in-numbers-the-facts-and-figures-to-know.
45. Bodansky, supra note 38, at 161 (“[T]reaties must be formally ratified by states,
usually with the approval of the legislature. So acceptance of a treaty generally signals
greater domestic buy-in and commitment than acceptance of a political agreement, which
typically can be done by the executive acting alone.”).
46. Id.
47. Id. (noting that international tribunals and domestic courts can apply legal
obligations).
48. Steve Herz, Paris Climate Deal Needs to be Politically, Not Legally Binding,
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enforcement mechanisms, a legally binding agreement was no more
likely to change state behavior than a non-binding instrument.49
Others argued that while bindingness might be a worthwhile
characteristic, in this circumstance it could discourage participation,
or even lower ambition.50
The famously binding Kyoto Protocol was offered as an
example of a treaty that had both scared Parties away and failed to
react when its Parties didn’t comply or withdrew.51 Proponents of a
legally binding agreement argued in response that the Kyoto Protocol
failed not because of its legal form, but because of the unwillingness
of the United States and other major economies to act on climate
change.52 In other words, with regard to the Kyoto Protocol, there
was a misalignment from the outset between the depth of key Parties'
political will and the design of the agreement.
V. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES BEHIND THE DEBATE OVER LEGAL
CHARACTER
The debate over the legal character of the Paris Agreement can
be seen from three political perspectives:
First, that of major developing country economies and middleincome countries that had never before undertaken binding
commitments to reduce greenhouse gases. Among these countries,
India, which has grown to become one of the world's largest emitters
of greenhouse gases, still has more than 300 million people living off
the grid.53 These countries wanted to avoid signing up to binding
CLIMATE CHANGE NEWS (July 26, 2017), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/07/26/
paris-climate-deal-needs-politically-not-legally-binding/.
49. Id. (“Most legal analysts, climate negotiators, and other close observers of the
process have taken the position that the agreement itself makes emission reduction pledges
essentially voluntary, since countries have free rein to set their own targets and policies and
are not required to meet the targets they put forward.”).
50. Id.
51. Brad Plumer, Stay in or Leave the Paris Climate Deal? Lessons from Kyoto, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/climate/paris-climate-agreeme
nt-kyoto-protocol.html.
52. Id.
53. Vanita Awasthi & Rohit Kumar Gupta, COP 21: THE PARIS PARADIGM , INT ’L
JOURNAL OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES (Dec. 2016), https://ijlss.wordpress.com/2016/12
/21/cop-21-the-paris-paradigm-by-vanita-awasthi-rohit-kumar-gupta-volume/
(“India’s priority is economic growth and the eradication of poverty. A fifth of its population
does not have access to electricity, so electrification is a priority for the country. Indian
government agencies are preparing plans for domestic climate action, but these would only
slow the growth of carbon emissions.”).
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commitments that could compromise their development priorities.54
They were accustomed to signing up to climate agreements that had
binding obligations for richer countries, but not for them, and
continued to see this as a dimension of “equity” and a reflection of
“historical responsibility.”55
Second, as has been described, the Obama Administration was
keen to shape and join the Paris Agreement but faced constitutional
and political constraints.56 The United States made it clear that it
could not join if the form of the Agreement would require the advice
and consent of a Republican dominated and historically reluctant
Senate.57 But it is fair to say that during the negotiations, the
boundaries of the President's Executive Authority to bind the state
were not well-understood. Finding a way to understand and
accommodate these concerns without gutting the agreement occupied
a lot of time. Politically, the United States could not sign onto an
agreement that held it, as a developed country, party to a higher
standard of “bindingness” than developing countries, particularly
China.58 The European Union, and the rest of the industrialized
countries, shared this political constraint.
Third, the European Union and other progressive countries were
pushing for higher ambition and saw a binding legal character as a
key aspect of ambition.59 For the European Union, this was also
about raising its competitors up to the same standards to which it had
been held under the Kyoto Protocol.60 For small islands, this was an
“existential issue”—they needed confidence that the agreement on
which their survival depended would be as strong as possible.61
Many governments shared a concern that a deal struck between the
United States and major emerging economies, each uncomfortable
with bindingness for different reasons, would lead to a low common
denominator agreement, including one with a weak legal character.
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id. at 22.
56. Raymond Clemencon, The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal
Failure or Historic Breakthrough, 25 J. ENV’T & DEV. 3, 6 (2016).
57. See generally David A. Wirth, Is the Paris Agreement on Climate Change a
Legitimate Exercise of the Executive Agreement Power?, LAWFARE (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/paris-agreement-climate-change-legitimate-exercise-executive
-agreement-power.
58. Clemencon, supra note 56, at 5.
59. Paris Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N., https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/internation
al/negotiations/paris_en (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
60. Id.
61. EUROPEAN COMM’N, CLEAN ENERGY FOR ISLANDS INITIATIVE 1 (2018).
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These differing perspectives on legal character led negotiators to
explore the design of an internationally legally binding agreement,
containing provisions with variable legal character.62 Participation in
a binding treaty could be encouraged by enabling each Party to
determine nationally the form of target and level of ambition it was
prepared to bind itself to. The needle of U.S. constitutional and
political constraints could be threaded with an agreement containing
commitments (or rather "contributions") that amount to binding
obligations of conduct, without being binding as to their result. A
high degree of “functional bindingness” could be built into the Paris
Agreement by ensuring it had the highest standard transparency and
accountability provisions. And the legal character of Parties'
contributions could evolve over time. Paris has the potential to be
dramatically more inclusive than both the Convention and the Kyoto
Protocol in terms of the participation of Parties and its coverage of
global emissions.
VI. THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE PARIS
AGREEMENT
The legal character of an international agreement can be said to
have four essential dimensions. The first is the legal form of the
Agreement itself.63 This dimension examines whether the Agreement
is a treaty under international law.64 The second is the mandatory or
prescriptive nature of the provisions within the Agreement.65 Third,
the specificity and precision of these provisions: the details of what a
Party must actually do to abide by the terms of the Agreement.66
Finally, the rules, procedures, and institutions in place to hold Parties
accountable for their commitments, and to compel their compliance.67

62. See infra Section VI.
63. Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement: A Primer, OPINIO
JURIS (Feb. 12, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/02/the-legal-character-of-the-parisagreement-a-primer/ (arguing the Paris Agreement is a treaty within the meaning of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); see also infra Section VI(A).
64. Id.
65. Id. (“Often treaties contain a mix of mandatory and hortatory elements … So even
though the Paris agreement will be a treaty, not every element of it need be legally binding
on the parties.”). See also infra Section VI(B).
66. Id.; see also infra Section VI(C).
67. Id.
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A. The Legal Form of the Agreement
On its face, the Paris Agreement is a treaty within the meaning
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As such, it (a)
requires any country that wishes to be a Party to notify its consent to
be bound (through ratification, acceptance, approval or accession);68
(b) allows for no reservations;69 and (c) provides that Parties will
remain bound unless and until they withdraw.70
The Paris Agreement is a “related legal instrument” to the
UNFCCC, adopted by its COP, and since signed, ratified and brought
into force by its Parties.71 It is not a "protocol" by name but it is
legally indistinguishable in its basic legal form from the Kyoto
Protocol (i.e. it is a treaty), and it meets the only relevant UNFCCC
rule on the adoption of protocols: the text that led to its adoption was
circulated to UNFCCC Parties six months before it was adopted.72
As a treaty, and consistent with the Durban mandate that set
the terms of reference for its negotiation, the Paris Agreement is an
outcome with legal force (based on its form, and as we shall see, its
content).73 It was characterized by the Obama administration under
U.S. law as an executive agreement.74 It does not carry the title of a
"treaty" or "Protocol" due to U.S. constitutional and political
sensitivities.75
B. The Mandatory and Specific Nature of the Commitments: or
"Who is Bound to do What, and by When?"
The Paris Agreement contains a variety of guiding provisions.
Article 2 sets out “the purpose” of the Paris Agreement.76 Within
that purpose there seems to be multiple “aims,” referred to elsewhere

68. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 20.
69. Id. art. 27.
70. Id. art. 28.
71. UNFCCC, art. 7.2.
72. UNFCCC, art. 17.2.
73. Kayla Clark, The Paris Agreement: Its Role in International Law and American
Jurisprudence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 117–18 (2018).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.
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in the Agreement as “goals.”77 There is also a reference to the
Convention's "objective" as well as a reframing of a couple of the
Convention's “principles.”78
The Agreement contains a range of more specific provisions
described variably as contributions, efforts, actions, targets, strategies
and plans.79 These provisions are framed in language that ranges
from “shall,” “should,” “will,” and “strive.”80 The provisions are
directed at each Party, at all Parties, at categories of Parties
(developed, developing, etc.), at institutions, and at no one in
particular.81 Some obligations are specific, some general, a few are
indecipherable (these are rare), but a number are sufficiently precise
and prescriptive to be both mandatory and, presumably, in some
jurisdictions, justiciable.
The core of what each Party will do in substance is nationally
determined and nationally tailored in terms of its specific and
prescriptive nature.82 Indeed, some contributions, as designed
nationally, are conditioned on the actions of other Parties in
providing support and/or on the performance of their own economies,
by linking emissions reductions to growth in GDP.83
Such a variety in the legal character of different provisions is
not unusual in international agreements, which often must balance
multiple issues and priorities.84 However, to a degree, this may be
unique to the Paris Agreement and to the issue of climate change.
The variety of obligations becomes clear when comparing the
Agreement’s provisions on mitigation, support and adaptation. While
Article 3 calls for all Parties to make “nationally determined
contributions” in each of these areas of climate policy, they are do so
“as defined” in the relevant articles of the Agreement.85 Article 4
(discussed in more detail below) addresses mitigation, and contains
the most Party-specific obligations, applicable to all Parties.86
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 2.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.
82. Lavanya Rajamani & Jutta Brunnee, The Legality of Downgrading Nationally
Determined Contributions Under the Paris Agreement: Lessons From the US
Disengagement, 29 OXFORD J. OF INT’L LAW 537, 541 (2017).
83. Id. at 538.
84. Rajamani, supra note 83, at 547.
85. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3.
86. Id. art. 4.
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Articles 9, 10, and 11 describe the more general obligations of
developed Parties to provide finance, technology, and capacity
building to developing countries, whereas Article 7, on adaptation,
has the most general obligation.87 The main reason that individual
commitments on finance are relatively weak was the unwillingness
and the constitutional inability of many traditional donors to commit
in advance, and in a binding way to specific financial targets. One of
the reasons the provisions on adaptation are very soft in their legal
character is because setting baselines and measuring progress on a
country's “resilience” to climate change is difficult. The actions
necessary are not well-understood, and many vulnerable countries
were reluctant to take on specific commitments that could become
burdens of implementation, or conditions for accessing funding. So
what might appear in the Paris Agreement to be a random pattern of
legal character, reflects a shared sense that the provisions related to
mitigation should be the most prescriptive and precise.
C. Procedures and Institutions for Transparency, Accountability
and Compliance
One of the biggest challenges, and perhaps the most important
accomplishment of the Paris Agreement, was to bridge the divide
between developed and developing countries through an enhanced
transparency framework for the measuring, reporting and verification
of Parties' performance, applicable to all Parties, but with flexibilities
that take into account differences in national circumstances and
capacities.88 Each Party will be required to report every two years in
accordance with agreed methodologies and comment metrics.89
The transparency framework is also applicable to all the
Agreement's provisions, but with tailored approaches to accounting
and/or transparency rules for mitigation, finance, and even for
adaptation.90 The transparency framework, with regard to mitigation
and the provision of support, is backed by a three-part accountability
system: (1) an expert review process with the purpose of "tracking
progress towards achieving" NDCs, and a mandate to “identify areas

87. Id. arts. 7, 9–11.
88. Transparency of support under the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int
/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/transparency-of-support-ex-post/transparency-of-suppor
t-under-the-paris-agreement (last visited April 28, 2019).
89. What is the Paris Agreement?, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/proces-and-meetings
/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement (last visited Apr. 28, 2019).
90. Transparency of support under the Paris Agreement, supra note 88.
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of improvement;”91 (2) a multilateral consideration or peer review
process that will consider each Party's respective “implementation
and achievement” of its NDC;92 and (3) a mechanism to facilitate
implementation and compliance with (all provisions) of the
Agreement, under a Standing Committee of experts that will operate
in a “facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of
national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties.”93
Together, these procedures will not only provide an evidence
base of whether Parties are performing against their commitments,
but create regular moments of institutionalized political
accountability for progress made at the international and domestic
level. The rules build capacity at the country level to measure and to
manage emissions. While there are no “consequences” for noncompliance identified in the Paris Agreement, the system can evolve
over time.94 Nonetheless, together these elements add up to one of
the most robust and comprehensive transparency and accountability
frameworks of any international environmental agreement.95
VII. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF PARIS AGREEMENT’S EMISSIONS
REDUCTION TARGETS (NDCS)
While the Paris Agreement sets out bold long term temperature
goals and calls for climate neutrality in coming decades, it is Parties’
individual NDCs and how well they perform against them that will
determine whether these ambitious goals are met. The nationally
determined nature of the NDCs has led nearly every Party to the Paris
Agreement to communicate an NDC, with many of them taking on,

91.
92.
93.
94.

Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 13(5), 13(12).
Id. art. 13(11).
Id. art. 13(3).
Anders Corr, Expect Climate Catastrophe: Paris Agreement Lack Enforcement,
FORBES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/12/01/expect-climatecatastrophe-paris-agreement-lacks-enforcement/#1a0987a83313 (“Enforcement mechanisms
for climate change targets are not being implemented, including in the Paris Agreement of
December 2015.”).
95. Paris Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/internat
ional/negotiations/paris_en (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) (noting that “[g]overnments agreed to
… track progress towards the long-term goal through a robust transparency and
accountability system”).
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for the first time, a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.96 The
NDCs are therefore the Agreement's greatest strength—and also,
potentially, its greatest vulnerability.
The unique legal character of the NDCs under the Paris
Agreement is determined by how the mitigation contributions are set
and anchored in the Paris Agreement, how and where the targets are
“housed,” and how they are made operational.
A. How are the mitigation contributions set?
The content of each mitigation contribution has been nationally
determined.97 The precision and prescriptiveness of each Party's
contribution will, in part, determine what that Party is bound to do.
For most of the 189 Parties to the Paris Agreement, the Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) received by the
Secretariat in the run up to Paris became NDCs when they joined the
Agreement.98 These documents are remarkably diverse in their form
and content: from the EU's 10-year carbon target 2021-2030, to the
US point target for 2025, to China's pledge to peak its CO2 emissions
"around 2030," to a diverse mix of policies and measures,
conditioned and unconditional.99
The Paris Agreement encourages all Parties to move over time
towards more precise and prescriptive mitigation contributions that
are economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets.100 It
includes guidance on how Parties will improve the clarity and
comparability of their NDCs.101 All Parties are required to account
for the net emissions and removals corresponding to their
contributions in a way that “promote[s] environmental integrity,
transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability, and
consistency.”102

96. NDC Registry (interim), UNFCCC, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging
/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) (“[One hundred and eighty-two Parties have
submitted their first NDCs. [One] Party has submitted their second NDCs.”).
97. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(2).
98. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Synthesis Rep. by the Secretariat,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2016/2 (May 2, 2016), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/e
ng/02.pdf.
99. The NDC Platform: A Comprehensive Resource on National Climate Targets and
Action, WORLD BANK (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange
/brief/the-ndc-platform-a-comprehensive-resource-on-national-climate-targets-and-action.
100. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(4).
101. Id. art. 4(8).
102. Id. art. 4(13).
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Thus, while nationally determined, the Paris Agreement puts in
place processes designed to improve the prescriptiveness and
precision of targets over time.103 While these new rules will not
apply until the next round of contributions (for most Parties this is
post 2030), any Party at any time can update its contribution to
enhance its level of ambition.104
B. How the Mitigation Contributions Anchored?
This was the most contentious part of the discussions on legal
character—how each Party's obligation with regard to its NDC is
expressed—the textual "anchor." Here the three perspectives I
mentioned—the reluctant major emerging economy, the
constitutionally challenged United States, and the aligned
progressives—came most sharply into focus.
While some emerging economies remained cautious about the
legal character of contributions, their primary concern was to ensure
they would not be bound in a way that compromised their
development priorities.105 This concern was largely addressed
through the nationally determined nature of the contributions.
The main battle ground, what is now Article 4(2) of the
Agreement, saw a struggle between the United States and the
progressives in the context of a rather fluid understanding of U.S.
constitutional and political constraints. In order for the United States
to join the Agreement under the President's Executive authority,
negotiators came to understand the Agreement would need to meet a
three-part test:
It would have to fall within the general foreign policy
powers of the President as set out in the U.S.
Constitution;
It could not commit the United States to international
obligations beyond the scope of those necessary to
implement the UNFCCC, which the Senate had
already ratified; and
103. What is the Paris Agreement?, supra note 93.
104. Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris
from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, ¶¶ 31–32.
105. Matthew Dalton & Gabriele Steinhauser, Compromises Make Global Climate Deal
More Possible, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/developingnations-hesitant-to-embrace-global-warming-limits-1449768622 (noting that priority of the
developing-nation group is fighting poverty rather than cutting greenhouse-gas emissions).
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Its implementation would need to be consistent with
authorities the Executive had already been granted by
Congress under existing legislation.106
No one could claim to fully understand these boundaries as
applied to these particular negotiations.
But the Obama
Administration was clearly keen to provide the United States with a
comfortable legal buffer, in a context where there were limited
analogous precedents and even less jurisprudence.
It was understood that the U.S. President can, through an
Executive Agreement, enter into an international legally binding
agreement and that the Paris Agreement was emerging as one that
would be seen as in furtherance of the implementation of the
UNFCCC, which the Senate had already ratified.107 But the President
could not bind the United States internationally to achieving a
specific target of the kind it had included within its INDC unless it
had full confidence that it could achieve that target without additional
Congressional action.108
There was much at stake.
Accommodating the U.S.
constitutional constraints would weaken the international legal
character of all Parties' mitigation contributions. But reaching an
agreement that would a priori exclude U.S. participation was
unthinkable. It fell in part to the European Union to push the United
States to be bound to its target as tightly as possible, while at the
same time reassuring other progressive Parties that the compromise
on offer was worth pursuing. We came to an understanding that a
compromise could lie in a classic distinction between an obligation of
result (what Kerry referred to as “Kyoto style” targets),109 and an
obligation of conduct. Targets binding as to outcome, as we

106. Luke Kemp, US-proofing the Paris Climate Agreement, 17 CLIMATE POL’Y 86
(2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2016.1176007.
107. Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 102-38, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Oct. 7, 1992), https://www.congress.gov/treaty-docume
nt/102nd-congress/38/resolution-text.
108. See generally Kemp, supra note 106.
109. Demetri Sevastopulo & Pilita Clark, Paris Climate Deal Will Not be a Legally
Binding Treaty, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/79daf872-889411e5-90de-f44762bf9896.html#axzz3zTw0Re5w (noting that John Kerry “stressed there
were ‘not going to be legally binding reduction targets like Kyoto,’ a reference to the 1997
Kyoto [P]rotocol”).
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understood it, were a step too far, as these would require
Congressional action in a context where the Executive's regulatory
authority proved insufficient to achieve that target.
On the other hand, if an obligation of conduct was expressed in
sufficiently precise terms and connected to the objectives of the
NDC, this could produce a meaningful and verifiable obligation. In
this context, it was very helpful to be able to point to the level of
effort the Obama Administration had been making in the lead up to
Paris to achieve its non-binding pledges under the accords agreed to
in Copenhagen110 and Cancun.111 The European Union could accept
and sell to others a commitment that would bind a future U.S.
Administration to do the same—to pursue, if not to achieve, its target.
The resulting language in Article 4(2) should be read exactly as
it is written, with the parentheticals I provide for emphasis:
Each Party shall [is legally bound to] prepare,
communicate, and maintain successive nationally
determined mitigation contributions that it intends to
achieve. Parties shall [are legally bound to] pursue
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of
achieving the objectives of such contributions.112
These provisions create binding and specific “obligations of
conduct” requiring each Party to have a mitigation contribution, and
to take identifiable steps towards achieving that contribution.113
Article 4(2) does not, on the other hand, convert NDCs into “Kyoto
style targets,” or obligations of result.114

110. Information Provided by Parties to the Convention relating to the Copenhagen
Accord, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE , https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences
/copenhagen-climate-change-conference-december-2009/statements-and-resources/inform
ation-provided-by-parties-to-the-convention-relating-to-the-copenhagen-accord (last visited
Mar. 23, 2019); Letter from Todd Stern, U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, to Yvo de
Boer, Exec. Sec’y, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 28, 2010),
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/unitedstatescpha
ccord_app.1.pdf (containing “the submission of the United States concerning its emissions
reduction target, in the format set forth in Appendix 1 to the Copenhagen Accord”).
111. Intro to Cancun Agreements, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE , https://unfccc.int/
process/conferences/the-big-picture/milestones/the-cancun-agreements (last visited Mar.
23, 2019).
112. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(2).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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C. How are the Mitigation Contributions Housed?
Each mitigation contribution will be communicated by each
Party and recorded by the Secretariat in a public registry.115 Thus,
the contributions in the registry will not be adopted or ratified by the
Parties and can be changed by the respective Party without amending
the Agreement.116 This arrangement reinforces the view that the
content of the NDCs is not part of the Agreement, and therefore not
binding on the Party concerned.
D. How are the Mitigation Contributions Made Operational?
While Parties are not legally bound to achieve their NDCs, the
mitigation contributions are nonetheless integral to the operation of
the Agreement, and essential to achieving its objectives. They are
what will be tracked on an individual basis.117 They will be
aggregated collectively as part of the global stock take to assess
whether the Parties are on track collectively to reaching the Paris
goals.118 NDCs must be communicated, updated, or made new every
five years.119 NDCs should become the key planning tool for inward
investment, foreign investment and, for eligible Parties, development
assistance. They will, under the Paris Agreement, remain nationally
determined, and obligations of conduct. Because Parties will update
them every five years, they should obviate the need for the
negotiation of any new climate change treaty. In other words, the
NDCs are both the means by which the Paris COP succeeded, and
they will determine whether the Paris Agreement succeeds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In retrospect, where does the Paris Agreement and the
compromises it strikes, leave the role of international law in shaping
state behavior? Is this a ground breaking and bold experiment, a
pragmatic and functional hybrid, a model for other areas of
multilateral negotiations that need to capture ambition across very
115. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(12) (“Nationally determined contributions
communicated by Parties shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the
secretariat.”).
116. Id.
117. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 13(7)(b) (providing that parties shall provide
“[i]nformation necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its
nationally determined contribution under Article 4”).
118. Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris
from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, ¶ 99(a)(i).
119. Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(9).
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diverse Parties?
Or is it an expedient fudge necessary to
accommodate the constitutional dysfunction of one country and its
continued reluctance and that of many others to fully embrace the
need for change?
Perhaps the Paris Agreement is both. But I am hopeful that we
landed upon a unique compromise in which international obligations
to prepare, communicate, pursue, account for, track, and
successively, as well as progressively, update targets will, in the
bright light of regular international attention and in the heat of a
warming planet, sink deep roots into domestic legal and political
systems—perhaps more deeply than Kyoto-style targets.
These roots will need to reach emerging constituencies of
demand in all major economies, concerned about climate change and
inspired by the Agreement’s goals and visions: avoiding dangerous
temperature rise, peaking emissions, and achieving climate neutrality.
Like any political process, these roots need to be nurtured by the
belief that it is possible to succeed. The Paris COP brought that
belief to the international stage. The challenge now is to bring it
home to all of the Agreement's Parties.
Since these remarks were first made, and following the U.S.
announcement of its intent to withdraw, more countries have signed
up to the Paris Agreement, and none have left.120 Support for the
Agreement, from governments, local authorities, the private sector,
and civil society—including within the United States, has only grown
stronger.121 And in December 2018, the first meeting of the parties to
the Agreement concluded its work on a first edition of the “Paris
rulebook,” a set of mandatory and non-mandatory instructions that
will guide, among other things, how the Parties will hold themselves
transparent and accountable for the commitments they have made
under the Paris Agreement.122

120. Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-parisagreement.html (noting that Syria and Nicaragua signed recently, leaving the United States
as the only country that has rejected the Agreement).
121. Robinson Meyer, Most Americans Support Staying in the Paris Agreement, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/05/most-amer
icans-support-staying-in-the-paris-agreement/528663/.
122. Rebecca Hersher, Nations Agree on Rules to Put Paris Climate Agreement Into
Action, NPR (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/15/677109487/nations-agree-onrules-to-put-paris-climate-agreement-into-action.

